Weaponizing Anthropology. David Price. Oakland, CA: AK Press. 2011. p / bk 219 pp. ISBN 978-1-849-35063-1. Price $15.95.

Wars conscript civilians, and civilian pursuits, for military purposes. World War I, David H. Price points out, offered better killing through chemistry. World War II dragged theoretical physicists to the battle front. Anti-colonial insurgencies since the Forties conscripted anthropology to the imperial task. Price argues that anthropologists who value the integrity of their discipline should take notice. Anthropology, he explains, is reverting to original sins that professional codes of ethics tried to address. Founded by Western imperialists to subjugate native populations with the minimum of fuss and bother, anthropology matured as a discipline to pledge allegiance to values beyond the needs of empire. Its stated goals of doing no harm, and of protecting sources, provided a compass bearing toward academic respectability. Yet, these ethical goals are easily set aside when lives are at stake. Especially if those are the lives of the "boots on the ground" military forces occupying strange places far from home (8).

Weaponizing Anthropology is a lumpy compendium of previously published articles, grouped into three categories roughly reflecting past, present and future. In Part I, Price discusses the stealthy infiltration of academia by American military interests. A variety of scholarships and subsidies are dangled before cash-starved graduate students. Various agencies quietly assert themselves on American campuses, and offer substantial rewards to graduate students with crushing college loans. Subsidies appear for learners who pursue given lines of inquiry, such as the mastery of the languages of "strategic areas" - parts of the world that are targeted for American influence (26).

An amateur, as the word's derivation indicates, is motivated by a love for a discipline. But when pure love does not pay the rent, prostitution will. The funds available to support some lines of investigation, and some pre-determined results, channel scholarly attention into the directions favored by the holders of the purse strings. He who pays the piper calls the tune. The presence of subsidized scholars on campus also has a chilling effect on academic discourse. If some of your classmates are junior secret agents in training, have these academic mercenaries started compiling dossiers on their peers, and reporting thought crimes to their handlers? For those

who take the bait, the question remains: if their paymasters require them to violate professional standards, academic ethics, and their own consciences, can they change their minds? And what will it cost to back out of a Faustian deal? A substantial amount, according to Price. The buyers of professional expertise can, and do, impose great fiscal pain upon purchased assets who want to leave the reservation.

In Part II, Price examines several leaked field manuals for "human terrain teams" (48). These manuals tend to be second-rate hack jobs frankensteined together from a smorgasbord of diverse, contradictory, and incompatible components. The emphasis is upon the format - as long as the information appears to be provided in rigid and precise categories, the military is glad to pay for it. The assumption is that one can find a user's manual for every task. No need to think, just follow the directions. "Yes, we can define a whole way of life in terms of a few variables, and put the levers and hot buttons for managing that culture in your outsider's hands." (55)

In Part III, Price exposes the Achilles heel of weaponized anthropology. Even as a prostitute's customer can leave the transaction with unanticipated consequences, purchased expertise tends to mislead those who rely upon the counsel of domesticated pundits. Court prophets tell their employers what they want to hear. Can the buyers of weaponized anthropology reasonably expect top-rate results from scholars who are already compromised? Or is the war already lost when the anthropologists are brought in? Anthropologists "embedded" in military units are expected to provide instant expertise to aid the judicious application of force. Coming to grips with cultures that typically require years of living with the studied population; building trust; learning whom to trust; proving oneself trustworthy. In a counterinsurgency situation, however, conversations that last more than seven minutes can be ended by a sniper's bullet. The sales pitch that starts with "We're from a foreign government, and we're here to help you" begins the conversation with a credibility gap.

David Price does not seem to recognize the possible positive value of "weaponized anthropology." Historically, a number of colorful characters provided information of real value to their homeland, while pursuing quixotic quests of their own. Having independent interests and incomes allowed the best of the breed to make things clear to those who needed to

know. Captain Sir Richard Francis Burton sampled a variety of exotic sexual and religious experiences, provided the definitive English translations of *The Arabian Nights* and the *Kama Sutra,* and wrote book after book about his adventures in unknown parts of the world. A generation later T. E. Lawrence established himself as a reputable archeologist before taking time out to lead the largest Arab armies for centuries. During World War II and the Korean War, polymath and author Paul Lineberger advocated "psychological warfare" as a way to achieve military goals with non-violent means. This High-Church Anglican championed the Christian virtues of truth and love. Those enemy soldiers you seek to demoralize, Lineberger wrote, must sense that you are being honest with them, and genuinely care about them. He wrote a Chinese leaflet that made it possible for Chinese soldiers to simultaneously surrender and save face, and saved thousands of lives in Korea.

As George Orwell once pointed out, "People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf." Is it always a terrible thing if these "rough men" need do less violence?

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